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Abstract 
 
This article aims to discuss the remembering phenomenon of the seven words of 
the Jakarta Charter. Even though it happened in early Indonesia independent era, 
the rejection of deleting the seven words of Jakarta Charter still exists until now. 
The seven words abolition of the Jakarta Charter became myths and rites that used 
by Islamic fundamentalist groups to bring back past memories in Indonesia today. 
In the process, it became a collective or social memory among Muslim 
Fundamentalist group, and it gives great energy, and also dreaming, to the 
fundamentalist Islamic groups to struggle to remake Indonesia as Islamic State. In 
Indonesian history, it is a big problem because of two reasons. Indonesia is not 
Islamic state. Beside that this group also is not only using constitutional ways, but 
also unconstitutional ways, such rebellion, religious terror, and hijacking. 
Therefore, we need to reshape and reconfigure the memory of deleting the seven 
words of the Jakarta Charter. 
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A. Introduction 
This paper discusses the deleting phenomenon of seven words “with the 
obligation of carrying out Islamic shari‘a for its adherents” of the Jakarta Charter 
which is always to be crucial issues since formulated in BPUPKI / PPKI in 1945 
until today. This theme is very important to discuss because in the history of 
Indonesia, the deletion of seven words of the Jakarta Charter became unhappy 
moment for Islamism groups that want to create Indonesia to be Islamic state. Such 
seven words give great energy, and also dreaming, to the fundamentalist Islamic 
groups to struggle in order to remaking Indonesia as Islamic State. In addition, the 
effort to create their ideas, they not only use constitutional-democratic ways, but 
also through violence ways, as did by the DI / TII Karto Suwiryo in West Java, 
Aceh's rebellion led by Daud Beureuh, and in South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakar. 
The violence phenomena happened and triggered by that movement made most of 
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Indonesian, not only non-Muslim as like showed by representatives of East 
Indonesia in 1945, but also for Muslims themselves life in fear. One indication of 
the fear of the application of Islamic law can be seen from the defeat of Islamic 
parties in every election held, beginning in 1955 until 2009.  
Having had drifted in the national discourse during the New Order, after the fall 
of the new order in 1998 seven words of the Jakarta Charter has been requisitioned 
again. It is signed by the emergence of Islamic parties and fundamentalist Islamic 
groups that massively urged the government is to returning the seven words of the 
Jakarta Charter and applying Islamic law. Democratically, the demand to restore the 
seven words of the Jakarta Charter came back through the debate about the need for 
amendment of Article 29 UUD 1945 was rolling on the MPR Annual Session in 
2000. Two factions of the Islamic party of the Unity Development Party (F-PPP) 
and the Star Moon Party (F-PBB) in view of their general views insisted to return 
the seven words of the Jakarta Charter that have been deleted in the body of the 1945 
Constitution, particularly article 29. What did by F-PBB and F-PPP got massive 
support from non-parliament Islamic groups, such as the Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia, the Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia, the KISDI, and Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI). They do demonstration demanding imposition of 
Islamic law in Indonesia. Like as the Islamic political parties in Parliament, they 
urged that the seven words of the Jakarta Charter should be returned. Their demands 
to return the seven word of the Jakarta Charter are the entrance to apply Islamic law, 
and finally establish an Islamic state (Ismail, Pijar-Pijar Islam Pergumulan Kultur 
dan Struktur, 2002, pp. 35-41).  
In a democracy realm, what the Islamic parties and Islamic organizations that 
has the desire and struggle to re-enter the seven words of the Jakarta Charter "with 
the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari'a for its adherents" are actually 
legitimate, valid only. In the sense that the Islamic group wants to returning seven 
word should through constitutional ways. Like trade, the idea to return the seven 
words of the Jakarta Charter sold their wares to the Indonesian people through their 
representatives in parliament. Is the merchandise bought or not entirely depends on 
the community. They should not force the buyers (citizens) to buy their wares. In 
other words, if citizens do not want to buy their wares, they also have to receive it.  
The problems are groups that want to implement Islamic sharia in Indonesia are 
not merely struggling through constitutional ways, but also, sometimes, through 
unconstitutional ways, some rebellions and religious violence were supported by 
religious fervor to make Indonesia to be an Islamic state. There are some episodes 
of religious violence during the year 2011 and early 2012 that, in my opinion, as 
part of struggle to create Indonesia to be Islamic state, namely attacking on Jamaah 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in Cikeusik, Banten (February 7, 2011); riots and 
 Ahmad Salehudin 
 
236 Ijtimā’iyya, Volume 3, Number 2, September 2018 
 
burnings churches in Temanggung, Central Java (8 February 2011); book bomb in 
Utan Kayu, East Jakarta which cut off the hands of a police officer (March 2011); 
suicide bombings by Muhammad Syarif Yosoefa in the mosque surrounding police 
station in Cirebon on Friday (15/4/2011); and burning Syiah Islamic Boarding 
School at Sampang Madura (December 29, 2011). Such religious violence is to be 
frightening incident not only to those people who are to directly victim, but also 
indirectly victim such as the consumer mass media. Religious violence is always 
aired repeatedly by several television stations in some weeks and became the main 
menu of print media into for weeks has penetrated the public consciousness of 
Indonesia and became a kind of collective consciousness. It is not just about how 
religious violence repeated, but also the effect of it, that has caused tremendous pain. 
Through television, we can see how a mother was crying hysterically because of the 
child died, his house vandalized, and burned by the masses that use religious 
attributes. Little children were crying hysterically in fear to see their parents being 
beaten. A wife could only shed tears when interviewed by television stations because 
she was not being able to visit her husband who was dying in hospital because of 
lack of fees.  
Islam in Indonesia has always been defined by tolerance, moderation, and 
pluralism. In Indonesia Islam helped create the foundations of civil society that made 
the transition to democracy possible whereas in the Middle East Islam has been seen 
as anathema to democratization. As Robert Hefner has eloquently argued, Islam was 
the force that facilitated Indonesia’s transition to democracy. However in other side 
we also find how Indonesian Islamic fundamentalist use anti-democracy ways to 
implement Islamic law (shari‘a) by changing Indonesia to be Islamic state, or giving 
Islamic law (shari‘a) a constitutional status. The effort giving Islamic law (shari‘a) 
a constitutional status has been undertaken several times after Indonesian 
Independence Day, 17 August 1945. In that time some Muslim leaders (in June–
August 1945) struggled to introduce Jakarta Charter into the constitution 1945. The 
Jakarta Charter is the first draft of the preamble to that constitution and it contained 
what has since become a well-known seven-word: (1) dengan (2) kewajiban (3) 
menjalankan (4) syariat (5) Islam (6) bagi (7) pemeluknya [with the obligation of 
carrying out Islamic shari‘a for its adherents]. This phrase, famous today simply as 
the ‘seven words,’ was eventually withdrawn from the final draft of the preamble on 
18 August 1945. Since then, however, the status of the seven words has been a 
constantly controversial issue.  
How the Jakarta Charter has remained an ongoing issue in Indonesian politics 
is the struggle that arose during the debates over the most appropriate ideology for 
the Indonesian state during sessions of the Constituent Assembly from 1957 to 1959. 
However, for those expecting a profound role for Islam in the modern nation-state, 
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the struggle ended in failure. A decade later, the call for shari‘a re-emerged in the 
Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) sessions in 1966–1968, only 
to fail again. Although calls for implementation of shari‘a rules were unsuccessful 
on both these occasions, they certainly did not end in the late 1960s. There have 
been four discernible Muslim constituencies demanding it in the aftermath of the 
New Order regime (1966–1998), namely Islamic political parties, certain regions 
with a majority of Muslim inhabitants, Muslim militant groups, and sections of the 
Islamic print media. Even though the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in its 
annual session in 2002 decided not to amend the 1945 constitution to give shari‘a 
constitutional status, calls for the formal recognition of shari‘a continue (Abuza, 
2007, p. 1).  
 
B. Historical Memory of Seven Words: The Past in the Present Indonesia 
The emerge phenomenon of the demands of some Muslims to restore the seven 
words of the Jakarta Charter, with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its 
adherents" are deleted and replaced with "belief in one God" is very interesting to 
observe. Perhaps the founding father deleting the seven word was not only to 
maintain the integrity of new nation-state Indonesia, but also give equality to all 
citizens has never predicted that the decision to remove the seven words of the 
Jakarta Charter would be a crucial issue that will continue to haunt the history of 
Indonesian as nation-state.  
If we try to trace the historical records on the elimination of the seven words of 
the Jakarta Charter, then we will find a variety of responses that indicate a discourse 
reproduction concerning such elimination. For the religious nationalist groups, the 
removal is not an important issue, because what important for this group is not a 
form of Islamic state, but how Islam, as well as other religions, can be a spirit in the 
life of the nation. But the Islamists' response to the removal was very different. They 
considered that the removal of seven words is the anti-Islamic conspiracy and 
concrete manifestation of the defeat of Islam. 
Regardless of whether the historical perception of and response the Islamism 
group to the elimination of seven words is true or not, the seven word certainly is 
remarkable influence on the life of Indonesia nation-state, especially the relation 
between the nationalists and religious nationalists in one side and Islamist groups in 
other side. Seven words of the Jakarta Charter here transform to be myth and rites 
that greatly affect the lives of the Indonesian people. Myth, as said by Eliade, is the 
truth history. In this context, it is not important the history happened or not, but the 
point is the effect of the history.  
As myth and rites, seven-word of Jakarta Charter is to be collective or social 
memory among Indonesian society. The concept of collective or social memory has 
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clearly become central to understanding “how groups retain a sense of the past, and 
…. how a sense of the past can inform a group’s politics, religions, art, and social 
life in general. The role of personal memory is also important in shaping and 
transforming past experience, and its functioning equally problematic  (Zurbuchen, 
2005, pp. 6-7). By quoting Wolff (2001) words, Zurbuchen said that memory is a 
story teller, and like all storytellers it imposes form on the raw mass of experience. 
It creates shape and meaning by emphasizing and leaving others out. Personal 
narratives brought into the public sphere also transform other, with sometimes 
terrible result (Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 7). Jakfar Umar Thalib, for example, criticizes 
the New Order regime and secular rule. He said, “We don’t like Pancasila because 
it means that Islam is the same as other religions. This is not so. We believe that 
Islam is the highest religion and the best.” He even argued that “There is no way for 
Muslims to get respect from non-Muslims except through jihad.” (Abuza, 2007, p. 
68) 
From the collective or social memories perspective we can understand why the 
omitting seven-word of Jakarta Charter emerges the sprit among Islamism groups to 
struggle continually creating Islamic state. Islamism groups read and interpret the 
process of the omitting seven-word of Jakarta Charter as a result of betrayal to the 
Islamic struggle by some people in that time, such as Soekarno, Moh Hatta, Wachid 
Hasyim, Kasman Sigodimedjo, and Teuku Hasan. By producing “the social or 
collective of hate” through online media, printed publishing, and “rumors”, the 
“myth” of seven-word success to keep the spirit of Islamism groups to change 
Indonesia to be Islamic state never died even though the regime is always trying to 
diminish them.  
In producing social or collective memories, determining factor is not only the 
fixed texts or other emerging “sites of memory”, but also process of configuring 
memory, moment when the past can be reshaped and outcomes remain unresolved 
(Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 8). From this we will know and understand how the Islamism 
groups in Indonesia spread their ideas about seven-word and try to create their idea, 
such as rebellion, underground movement, religious terrorism, etc. By using this 
perspective, we will understand why Islamism groups used some ways in realization 
their idea.  
Starting from this knowledge, we should understand the model of their struggle. 
This knowledge is importance to discontinue the constructing process of social or 
collective of hate awareness. At moment when societies change direction –whether 
sudden or prolonged, through violent upheaval or more peaceful rebalancing of 
power—representation of the past may disappear, be transformed, and acquire or 
lose authoritativeness (Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 8). From this perspective we can look 
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forward how to make the power of social or collective of hate awareness among 
Islamism groups are reduced.  
 
C. Religion and State Relation: Islamic Perspective 
In order to present more clearly the political ideas of Indonesian Muslim, here I 
will briefly discus the relation between religion and state. Generally speaking, 
according to Faisal Ismail (Ismail, 1995, pp. 40-50), the relation between religion 
and state can be classified into three major theories.  The first is that the state and 
religion should not be separated, since Islam, as an integral and comprehensive 
religion, covers both worldly and other worldly life. The constitution of the state 
should therefore be officially based on Islam. The supporter of this theory, such as 
Abu A’la Mawdudi, Hassan Al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and other religious of the 
Ikhwanul Muslimin and Jamaah Islami. The seconds is that religion and the state 
should be separated, and religion confined to private affair. There should be no 
interference by religion in affair of the state. The constitution of the state should not 
be based on Islam, but on secular ideas. The first and the second kinds of state -
religion relation actually also happened in Indonesian history, but like we know it 
always failed. However, the first until today always attempt to create their idea. And 
the third is theory proposes a formal separation between religion and state where in 
the state’s constitution is not officially based on Islam, but the state still pays 
attention to or tackles religious issues. 
To give more clearly debate relation between religion (Islam) and state in early 
Indonesian Independent era, we can trace it by following debate between Abikusno 
Tjokrosuyoso, the leader of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII) and 
Mohammad Hatta, the secular nationalist (Noer, 1990) and the first vice president. 
Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, the leader of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), 
advocated that Islamic courts not only must remain but should also be strengthened 
through the provision of better-educated and government-paid judges. Moreover, 
their original jurisdiction over inheritance, which was transferred to the state court 
in the Dutch colonial period, should be restored. Above all, Abikusno not only 
defended the formal existence of the Islamic religious advisers, but also “argued 
forcefully for granting the Islamic umma its full due, which amounted to something 
very close to an Islamic state” (Lev, 1972, p. 37). For Abikusno and other Muslim 
leaders, Islam could only survive and grow stronger and be fulfilled as a religion if 
it had the state behind it.  
Meanwhile, on the relationship between religion and the state, Hatta’s stance 
was certainly different from that of the Islamic groups who argued that no separation 
between the private and public spaces in Islam. According to Hatta, “we will not 
establish a state with a separation of religion and state, but a separation of religious 
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affairs and state affairs. If religious affairs are also handled by the state, then the 
religion will become state equipment and . . . its eternal character will d isappear. 
State affairs belong to all of us. The affairs of Islam are exclusively the affairs of 
the Islamic ummah and the Islamic society (Lev, 1972, p. 37).  
 
D. The Jakarta Charter: Ideological Compromise   
In early 1945, there was already hot debate over the character of the future 
Indonesian state between Islamic and nationalist leaders in the Sanyo Kaigi 
(Advisers Council), an official body of the Japanese government. At the first round 
of meetings of the BPUPKI, which lasted from late May to mid-July 1945, both 
contending camps were openly confrontational in debating the basis for the new state 
of Indonesia. Three speeches of the nationalist group, presented by Muhammad 
Yamin, Soepomo, and Soekarno on 29 May, 31 May, and 1 June respectively, argued 
that the Five Principles (the Pancasila) would be the foundation of Indonesia. 
Although these three speeches were slightly different in formulating what should 
constitute the Five Principles, they shared a similar opinion that the Indonesian state 
should not be solely based on Islam.  
Among these three speeches, the most detailed one was Soepomo’s. Unlike 
Yamin and Soekarno, Soepomo explained more specifically what a non-Islamic state 
of Indonesia would look like. Having analyzed various theories of states in the world 
history, Soepomo came up with the idea of the state that requires “the unity between 
the leader and his/her people and the unity of all in the state”  (Yamin, pp. 110-114). 
However, as Soepomo emphasized, this kind of state was not meant to deny the 
interests of various groups or individuals in the society. Instead, “it recognizes and 
respects those interests in the sense that groups and individuals should be conscious 
that they are an organic part of the state totally and feel obliged to strengthen the 
unity and harmony among those parts” (Yamin, pp. 114-115). 
Criticizing the idea of an Islamic state propounded by the speakers from the 
Islamic groups, Soepomo highlighted the importance of the unitary model for the 
new independent state of Indonesia. For Soepomo, there were differences between 
“an Islamic state” and “the state that is founded on the high ideals of Islam.” In the 
former, “the state cannot be separated from religion. State and religion are one, a 
whole” (Yamin, p. 115). To create this Islamic state, according to Soepomo, would 
mean “not setting up a unitary state,” but “the state that is going to link itself to the 
largest group, the Islamic group” (Yamin, p. 117). 
Soekarno, who delivered his speech the day after Soepomo, underscored further 
the possibility of Islam giving its high ideals to influence the direction of a national 
unitary state. In this national state, according to Soekarno, Islam finds fertile soil, 
for “this is the best place to promote religion.” Islam can be defended by “mutual 
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agreement, achieved by deliberation, namely in the Parliament”  (Yamin, pp. 74-75) 
(Boland, pp. 22-23).  
The counterarguments of the Islamic groups during this first round of the 
BPUPKI meeting came from Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, the leader of Muhammadiyah 
(Hadikusumo S. K.). In his remarks, presented on 31 May 1945, Hadikusumo 
demanded the establishment of a state on the basis of Islamic principles for two 
reasons (Hadikusumo, 1997, p. 101). First, he claimed that Islam is strongly 
embedded at the heart of the Indonesian people. Addressing an audience that was 
mostly of the nationalist camp, Hadikusumo challenged them to look into the 
people’s hearts to discover what actually resided there. What was to be found, 
according to Hadikusumo, was that the majority of Indonesian people would have 
Islam in their hearts. Second, Hadikusumo mentioned that the fight against the 
colonial Dutch, which Muslims mostly initiated, was an incentive for Islam to be a 
formal religion in the new state (Hadikusumo, 1997, pp. 102-104).  
Responding to the idea of national unity presented by the nationalist group, 
Hadikusumo quoted various Qur’anic verses (Q.3:103 and Q.5:2) implying that 
Islam is an effective device to achieve strong unity (As quoted in Syaifullah, p. 106). 
It seemed, for Hadikusumo, that Islam has been the largest and the most important 
part of the unity of Indonesia for a long time. He apparently assumed that the unity 
of Indonesian people under Islam was naturally identical to the national unity of 
Indonesia. Accordingly, Hadikusumo saw no serious obstacle to the establishment 
of an Indonesian state based on Islamic principles. 
There was no immediate consensus from this first round of the BPUPKI 
meeting. Instead, nine members were chosen to look for a solution to the increasing 
tension between the nationalist and Islamic camps regarding the basis of the new 
state of Indonesia. They were Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, A. A. Maramis, Achmad 
Subardjo, Muhammad Yamin, Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, 
Agus Salim, and Wahid Hasjim. The first five represented the nationalist camp, 
while the rest represented the Islamic groups (Abikusno and Agus Salim were from 
Sarekat Islam; Abdul Kahar Muzakkir from Muhammadiyah, and Wahid Hasjim 
from Nahdlatul Ulama) (Bolland S. , pp. 25-26) (Anshari, p. 10). It is importance to 
note that A. A. Maramis was the only one of non-muslim representative in that 
forum, while the others were Muslim. The representative of the groups, after a long 
and tense debate, reached a historical political compromise, or gentlemen’s 
agreement, in the form of what Yamin called the Jakarta Charter. In this  Charter 
Soekarno’s Pancasila was reformulated to read as follow:  
1. Belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic 
shari‘a. 
2. Just and civilized humanity. 
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3. The unity of Indonesia. 
4. Democracy which is guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of 
deliberation among representatives, and   
5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. 
     
At the meeting on 22 June 1945, these nine leaders managed to arrive at a 
compromise. The nationalist group had an assurance from the Islamic group that the 
state of Indonesia would not be based on Islam, while the Islamic group received a 
concession from the nationalist group that the practice of Islamic shari‘a would be 
obligatory for Muslim citizens. This compromise, later well-known as the Jakarta 
Charter, constitutes the ‘seven words’ dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam 
bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya [with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice 
Islamic shari‘a] inserted in the formulation of the Pancasila as part of the preamble 
of the 1945 constitution (Bolland S. , p. 27).  
The compromise reached in the form of the Jakarta Charter was not, however, 
the final consensus. This temporary consensus then had to be brought to the second 
round of the BPUPKI meeting (10–16 July 1945) for deliberation by all BPUPKI 
members. On the second day of the meeting (11 July 1945), three members raised 
objections to the Jakarta Charter. The first was Latuharhary, a Protestant 
representative from Maluku, who demanded its revision, since it could have a big 
impact on other religions and might create difficulties with customary law (adat 
istiadat). The other two members were Wongsonegoro (a liberal Javanese) and 
Hoesein Djayadiningrat (the first Indonesian head of the Office for Religious Affairs 
during the Japanese occupation), who alleged that the Jakarta Charter would lead to 
religious fanaticism because Muslims would be forced to practice Islamic law. To 
Latuharhary’s objection, Agus Salim replied that the conflict between religious law 
and adat law was not new and in fact had been already resolved. He added that non-
Muslim citizens did not need to worry about “[their safety,” because it was “not 
dependent on the power of the state, but on the tradition of the Islamic community, 
which includes 90 percent of the population (Yamin, p. 259). 
In response to Wongsonegoro and Djayadiningrat’s  objection that the seven 
words may create fanaticism because Muslims would be forced to apply shari‘a, 
Wahid Hasjim reminded the audience of the importance of the principle of mutual 
deliberation (permusyawaratan) in Indonesia and that therefore there would be no 
compulsion. He further contended that if some members considered these seven 
words were going too far, there were other members as well who regarded the Jakarta 
Charter as not going far enough (Yamin, p. 259).  
The foregoing discussion shows that neither side was able to completely achieve 
its objectives. The Islamic groups failed to introduce Islam as a state ideology, while 
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the nationalists were disappointed that there were provisions in the constitution that 
Muslim citizens would be obliged to practice Islamic law and that to be eligible for 
the position of president of Indonesia, one must be a Muslim. Under these 
conditions, the inequality between citizens became clear, as Muslims were given 
more political rights and a higher status than others. For that reason, many non-
Muslim citizens did not feel bound by the draft constitution and viewed themselves 
being discriminated against by these provisions. Consequently, the nationalists and 
non-Muslim leaders decided on a counter-maneuver to reverse the situation. 
The rapid political developments that followed the declaration of the 
independence of Indonesia (17 August 1945), especially those that occurred on the 
day after that, 18 August 1945, cracked the compromise reached in the Jakarta 
Charter and wiped out all concessions given to the Islamic groups. The seven words 
in the preamble as well as in the article on religion were deleted and replaced with 
“Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God). In addition, the religious 
qualification for the president was withdrawn entirely from the constitution. The 
most important factor mentioned by many historians to describe this change was 
Hatta’s encounter with the Japanese navy (Kaigun) official on the evening of the day 
of independence, 17 August 1945 (Noer, 1987, pp. 40-41) (Anshari, pp. 54-56), in 
which Hatta was warned that Christians and the Protestants in the eastern islands of 
the archipelago would separate from the Republic of Indonesia if the seven words 
were included in the constitution. This threat to the unity of Indonesia directly 
changed Hatta’s stance over the compromise.  
He promised that he would convey this message to the members of the 
Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) that would meet the 
next morning. After more than two hours of lobbying between Hatta and the Islamic 
groups (Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, and Kasman Singodimedjo), the meeting of 
PPKI on 18 August 1945 revoked all decisions based on the Islamic groups’ demands 
made in the previous BPUPKI meetings. As Boland says: [the meeting] finally came 
to the conclusion that in fact Indonesia only could become and remain a unity if the 
Constitution contained nothing that was directly connected with Islam. Therefore, 
articles on Islam as the official religion of the state, the condition that the President 
must be a Muslim and “the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law” 
had to be removed (Bolland S. , pp. 35-36).  
The new consensus of 18 August 1945 regarding the deletion of the seven words 
of the Jakarta Charter would become one of the most controversial issues in the 
history of modern Indonesia.  
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E. Seven-Word: Myth and Rites   
It is important to discuss deleting the seven-word of Jakarta Charter because in 
Indonesian history we know that the seven words that have deleted being entrance 
point of Islamic fundamentalists groups to "accuse" Pancasila state. For this group, 
the elimination of seven words of the Jakarta Charter “with the obligation of carrying 
out Islamic shari‘a for its adherents” is a betrayal to the struggle of Indonesian 
Muslims. Therefore, according to this group, Muslims are obliged to return the seven 
words that have removed whatever the ways. 
The claim that the deleting of seven words of the Jakarta Charter actually need 
to be examined weather was the removal factually betrayal to the Indonesian Muslim 
struggle or not? If looking at the acquisition of Islamic parties in general elections 
since 1955 until 2009, we can make conclusion that Indonesian Muslims do not 
really want or do not even care about the seven words. If the Indonesian citizen is 
approximately 90% of civilian want an Islamic state or the application of Islamic 
Shari'a, Islamic parties will obtain a majority in episodes of general election. It 
turned out that if all the voices of Islamic parties are collected, their voices are still 
lower than the nationalist parties. This also happens after a new order, the 1999 
elections; Islamic parties with a promise to establish an Islamic state or apply 
Islamic law did not get a significant voice. Even, in the 2009 general elections, the 
number of votes collected by Islamic parties become less and less, about 30% than 
nationalist parties. There are even some Islamic parties that sell the romance of the 
past and the struggle to restore seven word of the Jakarta Charter “with the obligation 
of carrying out Islamic shari‘a for its adherents” got vote under electoral threshold 
(ET) 2.5%.  
Seeing this fact, the question is why Islamism groups still continue to fight to 
restore the seven words of the Jakarta Charter? Even Islamism groups use many 
ways to implemented their idea, not only by using constitutional way, but also 
through unconstitutional ways, such as rebellion and religious terror (ahmad 
Salehudin, 2011). Why does it happen? In my opinion, it happened because the seven 
words have become myth and rites in the life of Indonesia today.  
Myth and rites process was begun at 1949 when Sekarmaji Maridjan 
Kartosuwiryo and his Darul Islam military movement threatened Pancasila-Base 
state. Calling his army “the Indonesian Islamic army”, Kartosuwiryo took up arm 
and lead a violent revolt in West Java against central government. On August 7, 
1949, he formally proclaimed the foundation of what he called the Islamic state of 
Indonesia, of which he proclaimed himself to be Imam.  Later Karosuwiryo’s revolt 
was joined by Kahar Muzakkar (1921-1965) in 1952 in South Sulawesi where he 
also proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic state under Kartosuwiryo’s 
command. Moreover, a similar revolt brook out in Aceh in 1953 under leadership 
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Daud Beureueh which also posed trouble for the central government. All these 
movement contributed to the spread of disturbances in those areas where the 
rebellion began (Ismail, 1995, pp. 60-65).  
Other rebellion also emerged in 1977 that was Hasan di Tiro separatist 
movement. This movement tried to establish an independent state called the “Free 
Acehnese State”. There was another movement called Komando Jihad (holy war 
command), which was led by H Ismail Pranoto (known as hispran). The komando 
Jihad committed acts violence and terror in many areas, such as Bukit Tinggi, 
Padang and Medan. Another rebellion group was led by Abdul Qodir Djailani who 
launched an anti-government shortly before the 1978 MPR session. Vigorously 
advocating what he called “the Islamic Revolutionary struggle pattern” (Pola 
Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam), Djaelani was arrested and imprisoned for two and 
half years. The longest lasting movement was that led by Warman who, like Hispran, 
called his movement Komando Jihad. This movement was operating almost two 
years, 1978-1980 (Ismail, 1995, pp. 200-201).             
Another rebellion was led by the Imran Group, which attached the police office 
at Cicendo, Bandung on March 11, 1981 and then hijacked a garuda DC-9 flight 
from Jakarta, forcing it to land at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok. Imran called his 
movement the “Indonesian Islamic revolution Council” (Dewan Revolusi Islam 
Indonesia), struggling to overthrow Soehato regime and transform it into Islamic 
rule (Ismail, 1995, pp. 200-201). Such kind of struggle in creating Islamic state or 
implementing Islamic rule still exists until present day. Some religious terror, such 
as Suicide Bali bombing in 2002, Suicide bombing at JW Marriot and Ritz Charlton 
hotel, Jakarta, riots and burnings churches in Temanggung, Central Java (8 February 
2011); book bomb in Utan Kayu, East Jakarta which cut off the hands of a police 
officer (March 2011); suicide bombings by Muhammad Syarif Yosoefa in the 
mosque surrounding police station in Cirebon on Friday (15/4/2011); and burning 
Syiah Islamic Boarding School at Sampang Madura (December 29, 2011).  
The effort Islamism groups to make seven-word as myth and rites are not only 
by using rebellion, but also “academic” ways, that is by questioning the deletion 
process of seven words. In 1970, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, a former leader of 
Masyumi Party, questioned why Agus Salim, Abiskuno Tjokrosujoso, and Kahar 
Muzakkir, were not invited to the preparatory committee meeting. Mangkusasmito 
could not see how a meeting which lasted such short time could have succeeded in 
achieving an agreement leading to the withdrawal all Islamic sentences from the 
preamble of the 1945 constitution and its body (Ismail, 1995, pp. 56-57). Long 
before Mangkusasmito raised his objection, however, Isa Inshary in the 1957 
Constituent Assembly had already attached the outcome of the August 18, 1945 
meeting, which all Islamic references were deleted, us unfair action carried out 
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through dishonest politic. The Muslims of Makusasmito’s time renewed their 
accusation against the secular nationalist of having imposed this unfair situation 
upon them, which they had to accept in the name of tolerance (Ismail, 1995, p. 57). 
The accusation against secular state that nationalist secular/religious is unfair in the 
process of deleting Islamic references is still produced and reproduced until present 
day. If tracing this theme in media online, like searching by using Google, we can 
find a lot of information about, according to Islamism group, “unfair” deleting 
process of the seven words.     
What we need today is, in my opinion, how to resolve the main problem of 
“unfair” process in deleting seven words of Jakarta Charter. By using perspective of 
collective memories, what we need to resolve it is how to forgetting old memories  
and emerging new collective memories. Actually, if we are aware that the deletion 
of seven words have been emerging such kind of hate memories and “betrayal” 
action repeatedly, we actually have chance and opportunity to understanding the 
characteristic of hate memories. From this knowledge, we can make suitable 
decision how to reconfigure and reshaped memory of the past.  
 
F. Conclusion     
In this conclusion I just want to say that (1) the omission of seven word of 
Jakarta Charter is ideological compromise between Islamism group, Nationalist 
Islamic group, and nationalist secular. In this ideological compromise we should 
understand the deleting process of Islamic references in Jakarta Charter and later in 
the body of 1945 Constitution. As product of negotiation, of course the Jakarta 
Charter and the deleting of seven-word would not satisfy all of groups. However, its 
ways to satisfy all of groups.  
(2) We should aware that the deleting seven word of Jakarta Charter is used by 
Islamism group to create an opinion that the process of deletion is unfair process of 
dishonest politic. This assumption is directly or indirectly forming collective or 
social memory that “Muslim” should be struggling to returning seven words 
whatever the ways are. In Indonesian history, it is to be big problem because this 
group is not only using constitutional ways, but also unconstitutional ways, such 
rebellion, religious terror, hijacking, etc. What we need, as Indonesian civilian, is to 
reshape and reconfigure the memory.      
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